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Determinants Of Household Access To Formal Credit In The Rural Areas 
Of The Mekong Delta, Vietnam 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the factors affecting the access of rural individual and group-based 
households to formal credit in the Mekong Delta (MD), Vietnam. Poverty levels in the 
Mekong Delta have declined significantly over the last decades, but in the rural areas they 
remain significant. If it is assumed that access to credit is a suitable vehicle for poverty 
alleviation, it is necessary to assess the way households decide on borrowing. This paper 
identifies the determinants of the decision to borrow and of the amount that is borrowed by 
using the double hurdle model and the Heckman selection model. Data used in this paper 
were obtained from a survey of 325 rural households, conducted between May and October 
2009. The results indicate that household capital endowments, marital status, family size, 
distance to the market centre, and location affect both the probability and the amount of 
asking for credit.  
Key-words: Formal credit, Double hurdle model, individual and group-based lending, rural 
households. 
JEL: E5, G2, O2 
1. Introduction 
Vietnam has been transforming from a centrally–planned to a market–oriented economy 
since the Doi Moi (innovation) policy which was initiated in the late 1980s. The result of the 
policy has been a steady annual economic growth of 4.6 percent in the 1980s, 7.6 percent in 
the 1990s and 7 percent in 2008. This economic success may be considered as a good 
achievement in the light of surging inflation and global economic downturn. Yet, poverty 
levels remain relatively high in rural areas, with the inequality in development between rural 
and urban areas still being large. Moreover, the gap between rural and urban incomes is even 
increasing. Rural economies in Vietnam therefore deserve more attention and support if rural 
poverty is to be contained (Heltberg, 2003; Fritzen and Brassard, 2005).  
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The economic success in Vietnam can be partly attributed to the development of the financial 
system (Quach et al., 2003). In rural development programs, the government uses credit 
programs in an attempt to provide the rural poor with access to cheap credit in order to 
increase productivity and output in farm and rural non-farm sectors. Access to credit is 
considered to be an important tool for smoothly increasing consumption and promoting 
production, especially for poor households as confirmed in (Zeller et al., 1997; Robinson, 
2001; Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Conning and Udry, 2005; Swain et al., 2008). 
Armendariz and Morduch (2005), among others, argue that microfinance makes households 
wealthier, through an income effect that improves total consumption levels; and it also seems 
to have a positive impact on the demand for children’s health care and education, as well as 
leisure.  
Like other developing countries, the rural financial system in Vietnam as well as Mekong 
Delta includes a formal, semi-formal and an informal sector. The formal credit sector has 
followed the traditional approach (Ha, 2001) and it  is estimated that it accounted for only 
one-third of credit demand in the 1990s (Cao, 1997). The importance of the formal sector has 
been increasing in recent years.  Schipper (2002) reported that it was about 45%, using data 
from VLSS 2002. As a result, the share of credit supply of the informal sector has been 
decreasing from 73% in 1993 to 51% in 1998 (Nguyen, 2001).  
Arguably, the success of credit provision for poverty reduction by governmental banks 
depends on the possible access by poor households to these institutions. This level of access 
depends on the relationship of the demand and supply for rural credit. The former depends on 
households’ decisions on whether they want to borrow and how large the loans are, while the 
latter is an outcome of the credit rationing policy of the financial institutions. Obviously, 
households need credit when they lack financial assets for consumption and production, and 
this lack will depend on the household’s characteristics and the intended use of that credit.  
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Several studies have investigated the determinants of households’ demand for credit from 
different institutions using multinomial discrete choice models (Akoten et al., 2006; Pham 
and Lensink, 2007; Barslund and Tarp, 2008). In Pham and Lensink (2007), the model 
confirms that the supply of credit from formal, semi-formal and informal sources in Vietnam 
depends on the possible profits that can be made from the use of the loans. They add that 
credit supply may also increase if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or if credit is 
for business-related activities. In the case of Indonesia, Takahashi et al. (2010) found that 
access to credit is significantly affected by the relatively wealthier households but not by 
available collateral. The relation between gender and access to microcredit is discussed by 
Rahman et al. (2009).   
In this article we build on the analysis of Pham and Lensink (2007) with a focus on 
microfinance programs from governmental banks. We analyse how household characteristics 
affect the uptake and amount of credit. Getting a better insight into the reasons for the gap 
between demand and supply of rural credit at household level is indispensable for evaluating 
the current outreach of the microfinance institutions and for improving credit accessibility in 
Vietnamese rural areas. Reportedly, very few empirical studies have so far dealt with the 
determinants of a household access to credit in the MD region (Putzeys, 2002; Ninh, 2003).  
Our analysis focuses on the provision of microcredit by governmental banks. It is assumed 
that the availability of small loans without collateral requirement greatly increases the 
households’ probability to borrow (Tsukada et al., 2010). It is important to note that our 
analysis is based on the borrower’s characteristics. We acknowledge the importance of the 
lender and their need for credit rationing and careful client selection. Yet, arguably, it is the 
household that needs to file a request for credit to the lending institution, and the decision to 
do so determines the access to credit and ultimately also the amount borrowed.  
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This study is based on household data that were collected among a group of borrowers and 
non-borrowers in three provinces in the MD region in 2009 as shown in figure 1. A distinct 
contribution of this paper to the literature on microfinance in Vietnam is the comparison of 
two systems, individual and group-based lending. A double hurdle model and a Heckman 
selection model are used to calculate the probability of households to borrow and the loan 
amount taken out. Before discussing the methodology, a background on rural credit in 
Vietnam and its development is provided in the next section.  
2. Research background 
The Vietnamese rural financial system is composed of formal, semi-formal and informal 
credit providers. The formal institutions includes the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBARD), the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP), and the People Credit 
Funds (PCF) (WB, 2002). They are generally well-developed in the rural areas and there is 
little competition amongst these formal institutions. However, the formal institutions seem 
unable to respond adequately to all rural households’ demand for credit; and the credit 
demand is also met by the semi-formal and informal sectors. Semi-formal credit is provided 
by the national and international programs targeting a selective range of borrowers and 
conforming to certain development targets (Pham and Lensink, 2007). The informal sector 
consists of private moneylenders, revolving credit associations (RCA), relatives, friends and 
other individuals. Duong and Izumida (2002), using data from a small household survey 
undertaken in 1995, found that the informal sector accounted for 17 percent of all loans. As in 
other developing countries, RCAs are common in Vietnam, where they are called hui. These 
RCAs are groups of people with pre-established social ties who pool a small sum of their 
savings periodically so that each can in turn receive one large sum.  
Chart 1 shows the operational procedures of formal credit in Vietnam, such as applied by the 
VBARD bank. Most borrowers are individuals or private companies. As most of them do not 
 5 
have accounting records, it is very difficult for them to communicate with the banks and also 
difficult for the banks to acquire information on them. These banks are mostly based in the 
large cities or provincial towns. They are therefore operating at a fair distance from the 
potential borrowers located in rural areas. One way for the banks to mitigate information 
problems is to ask for collateral, i.e. land use rights and other valuable assets.      
 
>>>>> insert chart 1 about here 
 
 
In programs oriented towards poor and vulnerable households, the Vietnamese Government 
has included credit provision through microfinance institutions (MFIs) in their anti-poverty 
programs for the rural areas (Commins et al., 2001). Some of the programs target women 
who are found to be more credit-constrained than men. These are programs focusing on 
female clients who often join in groups, providing small loans for them to invest in income-
generating activities (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). The expected outcome is that rural 
female entrepreneurs can cope more easily with emergencies such as unfavourable natural 
events or be protected from further impoverishment during economic stress (Rutherford, 
2002). Women are also considered to be more reliable clients and to invest more in education 
and health care of their families (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). The operation of the MFIs 
is shown in chart 2.  
 
>>>>> insert chart 2 about here 
 
 
In the case of informal lenders, the credit procedures are very simple and mainly based on 
personal relationships between lenders and borrowers. In fact, if an individual household 
facing an urgent problem would like to borrow from the moneylenders, he/she needs to just 
ask the lenders. The terms of the loan will depend on their relationship. If the borrower is 
well-known and has a good relation to the lender, the probability of borrowing and the size of 
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the loan will be bigger. The credit procedure in this case is very short. Darling (2005) wrote 
for the informal lender that: “He is always accessible, even at night; dispenses with 
troublesome formalities, asks no inconvenient questions, advances promptly, and if interest is 
paid, does not press for repayment of principal. He keeps in close personal touch with his 
clients, and in many villages shares their occasions of weal or woe. With his intimate 
knowledge of those around him he is able, without serious risk, to finance those who would 
otherwise get no loan at all.”  
In the MD, there are mainly two types of lenders, namely formal (VBARD and VBSP) and 
informal lenders (private, friends, and relatives). The main differences between VBARD and 
VBSP versus informal lenders are summarized in table 1. The private banks are not operating 
in the study areas.  The traditional approach to lending is compared to informal lending in 
table 2 with regards to the characteristics and behaviour of the lenders.  
 
>>>>> insert table 1&2 about here 
 
Although they are part of government programs, the formal institutions seem unable to 
respond adequately to the demand for credit by the households. First, not all households who 
would like or need to take out credit, are accepted as clients because they fail to provide a 
proof of sufficient collateral. Secondly, the terms of the loans may not be appropriate. 
Especially the limited length of the loan may be restrictive to farmers who need the loan for 
an investment early in the planting season while they can only repay at harvest time, which is 
too late for the bank. Thirdly, the administrative procedures could be a serious burden to the 
rural household. Potential borrowers need to hand in application forms, production plans, and 
guarantee evidence. And they get repayment plans and claims in return. These procedures 
may be too important a burden for little-educated rural households.   
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Individual and household characteristics such as age, gender, household size, education level, 
race and the household’s wealth status (expenditure per capita) have been found to 
significantly affect a household’s access to (formal) credit (Mohamed, 2003; Okurut, 2006). 
In addition, the composition of household assets is found to be much more important than the 
total value of household assets or landholding size as a determinant of household access to 
formal credit. Okurut (2006) finds that higher shares of land and livestock in the total value 
of household assets are positively correlated with access to formal credit. Okurut (2006) also 
shows that access to semi-formal credit in South Africa is positively and significantly 
affected by household size, per capita expenditure, provincial location and being coloured, 
while the negative and significant factors include being male, rural location, being poor and 
White.  
Studies in Vietnam show that social characteristics of the household, level of household 
expenditure and asset levels have a significant effect on the probability of borrowing by rural 
households and on the size of the loan provided to them (Ha, 1999; Ha, 2001). The 
probability of borrowing increases with education and social responsibility of the household 
heads. Age negatively influences the probability of borrowing, but it has a positive effect on 
loan size. Household size has a negative effect on the probability to borrow as well as on the 
amount borrowed (Ha, 1999).  
In this paper we test whether several of these characteristics are also important for credit 
uptake and loan amount in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam by using the Heckman selection and 
double hurdle approaches. Our results should facilitate the identification and targeting of 
potential borrowers which could contribute to credit deepening and widening and as such 
could close the gap between credit demand and supply. Financial organizations need to know 
who they can reach in order to broaden their clientele base; and on the other hand, it is 
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important to know how much money people borrow and by what this is determined in order 
to address the demand for credit in a better way.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sampling, research area and data collection 
The data used in this paper were obtained by interviewing households in three provinces in 
the Mekong Delta namely: Can Tho, Soc Trang, and Tra Vinh. These provinces were chosen 
because their distinct socio-economic characteristics are representative for the Mekong Delta 
provinces. Can Tho city is the most important economic, cultural, scientific and technological 
centre of the Mekong Delta. Since we are particularly interested in rural credit, data were also 
collected from the more rural district of Thoi Lai, which has recently been divided into two 
new districts namely Thoi Lai and Co Do. These districts have traditionally supplied 
agricultural products and services to the urban areas of Can Tho. It hosts the headquarters of 
an agricultural research institute that supports rice production in the region. The second 
province, Soc Trang, is characterized by a greater ethnic diversity than Can Tho. Its economy 
is based on agriculture and the area is more prone to flooding. The district of Thanh Tri was 
chosen for this study because it has been found to be representative for the economic 
activities in the province. Finally, the province of Tra Vinh was chosen for its distinctive 
rural characteristics. Households were randomly selected in the Cau Ngang district. They 
were mainly employed in arable farming and the production of seafood.  In total 325 
households were interviewed, of which 219 (67 percent) had access to credit, and 106 (34 
percent) did not. The distribution of the respondents over the provinces is shown in table 3.  
The MD has experienced a considerable decline in the poverty rate since 1998. The poverty 
rate for MD in 2009 was 12.6%, lower than the overall country rate of 14.2% (GSO, 2010). 
The poverty rate has fallen over the last decades, but in the rural areas poverty remains 
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significant. The reasons are complex but the main causes are a high number of landless 
households and great land scarcity, lack of opportunities for stable non-farm employment, 
and lack of market participation (GSO, 2010).  
>>>>> insert table 3 and figure 1 about here  
3.2. Analytical method 
Bias factors due to sample selection arise because it is often impossible to identify a perfectly 
random sample of the population of interest. Particularly when observations are selected in a 
process that is not perfectly independent of the outcome of interest, selection effects may lead 
to biased coefficients in regressions of the different outcomes (Heckman et al., 1998). This 
may result in inconsistent estimates. In order to avoid these problems, one of the most 
commonly used approaches in econometrical analyses is the Heckman selection model 
(Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Schaffner, 2002; Schafgans and Zinde-Walsh, 2002; 
Vreeland, 2002). The two-step method includes the estimation of a probit model for selection, 
followed by the addition of a correction factor which is the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from 
the probit model, into the second ordinary least square model of interest (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009).  
Factors assumed to influence the uptake of credit are usually categorized as either 
knowledge-based and poverty-based (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). Knowledge-based 
determinants include age and education (Zeller, 1994; Kimuyu and Omiti, 2000); family 
business history, entrepreneurial experience, industry specific know-how, training and social 
capital, (Lore, 2007). Property-based determinants are land size, livestock, and other assets. 
Determinants of borrowing tested in this paper include age, gender, educational level, 
religion, marital status, family size, ethnic group, community involvement, red certificate of 
land use right, building value, distance to the nearest market centre, and provincial dummy. 
In the second step, determinants of the loan size are explored. Determinants considered to 
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influence loan size are age, gender, educational level, religion, marital status, family size, 
ethnic group, community involvement, total land size, building value, and provincial dummy, 
the instrumental variable of participation is distance of households to the nearest market 
centre, and whether or not the households have property (red certificate of their land). The 
model estimations were done in Stata.  
 
3.2.1. Double hurdle model (DHM)  
This paper also uses a DHM as formulated by Cragg (1971) assuming that the individual (or 
households) make two decisions concerning the borrowing and the amount to borrow. Each 
decision stage is determined by a different set of factors. According to the behavioural 
content of this model, two separate hurdles must be passed before a positive loan size can be 
obtained. The first hurdle involves the decision about whether or not to take out credit  from a 
formal bank (participation decision). It is reasonable to assume that the choice of access to 
credit is an economic decision and is influenced by social and demographic issues (Blaylock 
and Blisard, 1993). The second hurdle concerns the level of the loan obtained by the 
household. The two decisions can be regressed as dependent on or independent of each other. 
Following Lee and Maddala (1985) , the two decisions have been modelled as sequential in 
this paper. Formally, the double hurdle model can be specified as follows (Jones, 1989; 
Pudney, 1989): 
Observed loan size: Y = d.Y**        (1) 
Loan participation: W = α’Z+u (u ϵ N(0,1))       (2) 
d = 1 if W > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
Loan size equation: Y*=β’X+v (v ϵ N(0, δ2)       (3) 
Y** = Y* if Y*>0 and 0 otherwise 
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Where W is defined as whether the households decide to take out credit, Y* is a latent 
variable showing the households’ loan amount obtained, Y is the observed dependent 
variable (the amount of money the household obtained), Z is a vector of variables explaining 
the credit participation decision, X is a vector of variables determining the credit amount 
taken out, u and v are the corresponding error terms assumed to be independent and 
distributed as u ϵ N(0,1) and v ϵ N(0,δ2). The independence of the error terms is a common 
assumption in these type of models (Jensen and Yen, 1996; Su and Yen, 1996).   
Assuming that the error terms u and v are independent, the model can be assigned to follow 
Cragg’s model (Cragg, 1971) in which a zero loan amount has a subscript and a positive loan 
amount is shown by a subscript +.   
L = П0[1 – p(v>- αZ)p(u>- βX)] П+p(u>- β’X)f(y|u>- β’X) 
The Cragg model is a two-step approach with a probit model for probability of participation 
in the first stage and truncated normal regression in the second stage. 
An alternative assumption is to hypothesize that the error terms of the participation and loan 
amount equations are correlated, and that the participation decision dominates the loan 
amount equation. Jones (1989) refers to this case as a first hurdle dominance. The model 
implies that observed zero loan amounts are the result of participation decisions only and that 
once the first hurdle is passed censoring is no longer appropriate. This suggests that only 
individual households with a positive loan amount are included in the loan amount equation. 
The presence of first hurdle dominance results in a Heckman selection model, which is 
discussed next.  
3.2.2. Heckman selection model 
In the Heckman selection model, the household’s decision to a loan is assumed to be 
influenced by a number of household characteristics, as shown in the following equation 
(Greene, 2000): 
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W* = α’Z+u 
iiii uLaZ 
*
         (4) 
If Zi* is a dummy that a household takes a loan, equation (1) measures the probability that a 
household i has access to formal credit; Li is a vector of exogenous household variables that 
affect Zi*. The variable Zi* is not observed, but we observe if the household has access to 
credit or not, whereby Zi=1 if Zi*>0 and Zi=0 if Zi*≤0. 
Next, household characteristics are also assumed to influence the size of the loan the 
household takes out. Under the condition that Zi =1, Yi represents the log of the loan size 
expected to be received by each household, with the assumption that:   
iiii vXbY            (5) 
where Xi is the vector of variables determining the loan size. In equations (4) and (5), ui and 
vi have bivariate normal distributions with zero means, standard deviation δu and δv, and they 
are correlated with correlation coefficient ρ. It is assumed that Zi and Li are observed for a 
random sample of individual households, but Yi is observed only when Zi=1, that is, when the 
rural household i has taken out a loan. Modified from the equation by Heckman (1979), the 
expected loan size may be written as follows:  
)()|(
)|()0|()1|( *
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      (7) 
And φ and Ø are the normal density function and normal distribution function, respectively. 
The function µi(αu) is called the inverse Mill’s ratio.  
A least squares regression of Yi on Xi, without the term µi(αu), would yield inconsistent 
estimators of bi. If the expected value of the error was known, it could be included in the 
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regression as an extra explanatory variable, removing that part of the error correlated with the 
explanatory variables and avoiding inconsistency. Yet the error term cannot be estimated, and 
the inverse Mill’s ratio needs to be calculated and added to the estimation of equation (5).  
The first step of the Heckman model is a probit model (equation 4). The inverse Mill’s ratio 
is calculated from the linear prediction of this model. In the second step model, Y is regressed 
on the explanatory variables X and the Inverse Mill’s ratio, for all cases where the selection 
equation equals one, i.e. the household has access to formal credit. A highly significant 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio indicates that selection bias is present. This model is solved in one 
procedure in Stata.  
>>>>> Insert table 4 about here: 
 
4. Empirical results 
The following sections present the results of our analyses. We start by describing the credit 
institutions from which the households had taken out loans and we describe the major 
characteristics of these loans. Next, we give an overview of the household characteristics in 
the study area. We compare households by province and by whether or not they had 
borrowed money. The model results are given next.  
 
4.1. Overview of financial institutions in the Mekong Delta 
 
4.1.1. Credit institutions in the three provinces under study 
The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) and the Vietnam Bank 
for Social Policies (VBSP) are the two main providers of formal credit to households in the 
rural areas in Vietnam. The former was established in 1998 at the time of the reform of the 
financial system and the reintroduction of commercial banks in Vietnam. As a representative 
of the state policy bank, VBARD has been responsible for directed lending to the agricultural 
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and rural sectors. It enjoys government subsidies and access to central bank credit. By the end 
of 2001, it had become the leading commercial bank in Vietnam, with the most extensive 
network of branches in rural areas. The bank has gradually expanded and it has 64 branch 
offices and 592 transaction offices in the provinces. At the end of 2009, the VBARD banks 
had 479,000 billion dongs in total assets, an increase of 22 percent compared with 2008; total 
funding resources reached 434,331 billion dongs, and total outstanding loans was 354,112 
billion dongs, of which outstanding loans to agricultural and rural areas was 242,062 billion 
dongs (Agribank, 2009). VBSP is a smaller institution. By the end of 2008, total capital of 
VBSP reached 54,610 billion dongs, an increase of 51 percent compared with that of 2007; 
total outstanding loans reached 52,510 billion dongs (VBSP, 2008). 
In our sample, 53 percent of the respondents borrowed from VBSP and 42 percent from 
VBARD; the rest of the loans (about 5 percent) were provided by other financial institutions 
such as the People Credit Fund (Figure 2). The VBSP provides credit in two forms (see also 
chart 2). People can borrow directly from its branches or via social economic unions. The 
most important unions for VBSP lending are the Farmer’s Union, the Women’s Union, the 
Youth’s Union and the War Veterans’ Union. In the sample, these social economic unions 
accounted for more than 94% of the share of the credit  borrowed through VBSP, which 
indicates their importance in helping the poor to access credit. Following its objectives of 
poverty alleviation and social development, the VBSP does not require its clients who are 
poor households, charity households, or poor students to offer collateral for the loans. Most 
of the clients, however, need to have proof of collateral endorsed by the local government or 
other authorities related to the VBSP banks.  
VBARD offers individual loans to rural farmers and entrepreneurs. A land use certificate may 
be used as collateral. Secondly, VBARD also accepts borrowers in organizations who are 
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unable to provide collateral. Loans are channelled through so-called guarantee groups 
composed of the members of women’s unions, citizens’ unions, and veterans’ unions.  
 
>>>>> Insert figure 2 about here 
 
 
4.1.2. Loan characteristics 
The loan characteristics by type of borrowing scheme and type of bank are compared in 
tables 5 and 6. Individual households had the largest average loans with 18,970 thousand 
dongs
1
 while group-based households had on average loans of 10,150 thousand dongs. The 
interest rates charged per year to the households were 12 and 10 percent for individual and 
group-based lending, respectively. The average duration of the loans was about 20 months, 
but it tended to differ by type of borrowing scheme. Shorter loans were given to individual 
households (17 months), while the longer loans were provided to group-based households (24 
months). The VBARD offers larger loan amounts (18,000 thousand dongs on average) than 
VBSP with 10,198 thousand dongs while VBARD charges higher interest rates (12 
percent/year) than the VBSP with 10 percent/year.  
 
>>>>> insert table 5&6 about here 
 
Figure 3 shows that most of the borrowers have an average loan of 14,000 thousand dongs. 
Only seven households in the sample borrowed more than 40,000 thousand dongs. Overall, 
                                                 
1
 1 USD = 19,500 dongs  
Source: http://www.vietcombank.com.vn/en/exchange%20rate.asp 
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the credit supplied by the formal financial institutions in the rural areas of Mekong Delta is 
rather limited.  
 
>>>>> Insert figure 3 here 
 
 
 
4.2. Household characteristics of borrowers and non-borrowers 
Tables 7 and 8 compare the household characteristics of borrowers and non-borrowers. 
Households having taken out credit were relatively older than those who had not. In terms of 
education, non-borrowers had on average a lower educational level than the individual 
borrowers, but a higher level than group-based borrowers. Most of the borrowers had 
completed at least nine years of schooling.  
 
>>>>> insert table 7&8 about here 
 
Among the borrowers, 46 percent were of Vietnamese origin compared to 61 percent among 
the non-borrowers. The average family size of both borrowers and non-borrowers was five 
persons. It is furthermore hypothesized that if the household head has any social and/or 
political position in the village proxy through village work, he or she will have a high 
probability of receiving formal credit and would be less likely to borrow from the informal 
sector. Yet, this could not be confirmed by the chi-squared analysis. About 18 percent of 
borrowers and non-borrowers were involved in village work.  
Total landholding has been considered an important determinant of access to credit (Vu, 
2001; Zeller, 2001; Okurut, 2006). It is hypothesized that households with more land are 
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more likely to have an interest to expand production and a higher probability of borrowing. 
Land can also be used as collateral for the loan. In the survey, the average total landholding 
of individual and group-based borrowers was about 15,490 m² and 6,380 m² respectively, 
while that of non-borrowers was about 11,660 m².  
Another possible important determinant is the total income of households. The results show 
statistical differences in the total income between borrowers and non-borrowers. The total 
income of individual borrowers was statistically higher than the income of group-based 
borrowers and non-borrowers. On average, group-based borrowers were poorest.  
 
5. Determinants of access to credit by rural households  
Following the results of the probit model, access to credit was positively related to the marital 
status (being marred), not living far from the market centre, and living in Soc Trang or Tra 
Vinh province (table 9). Yet, the determinants of access to credit differed by borrowing 
scheme. The coefficients in table 9 show that the probability of individual access to credit is 
related to a higher value of building ownership and negatively to Vietnamese ethnicity and 
distance to the market centre. The access to credit by the group-based schemes is positively 
affected by the marital status and having a community work, but negatively affected by 
education, total land size, distance to the market centre, and being in Can Tho province. 
Clearly these group-based schemes target poorer households in the rural provinces which are 
socially involved in the village.  
 
>>>>> insert table 9 about here 
 
The determinants of the loan amount as calculated in the second step of the Heckman 
selection and double hurdle models are illustrated in table 10. The results show that the loan 
 18 
amount in general is positively related to being a male borrower, married households, being 
involved in the community, asset level, and having a small family. Loan sizes in group-based 
schemes seem to be higher for married households with a lower dependency ratio, being 
involved in the community, having more land and a higher value of building, not being in the 
Can Tho province. The double hurdle model additionally suggest that households with 
Vietnamese ethnicity may take out larger loans.  
For the individual borrowers, the loan size obtained by the households is positively affected 
by a smaller family size and having a job in the community. In addition, the double hurdle 
model predicts that households having at least one religion and being of Vietnamese ethnicity 
are likely to take out larger loans.  
Selection bias could not be proven as the inverse Mill’s ratio was not significant in the 
Heckman models. The findings confirmed that physical and social capital are significant 
determinants of access to credit and the loan amount for individual borrowers. In the group-
based models, human and social capital, i.e. marital status and having a community work, 
seem to be important. 
>>>>> Insert table 10 about here 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
This paper investigates the determinants of demand for formal credit by rural households of 
the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. The findings indicate that a household’s capital endowments 
are very important in the demand for formal credit as well as the loan amount. Other factors 
influencing the probability to borrow were marital status, distance to the market centre, and 
province. The findings are similar to those of previous studies (Bell et al., 1997; Ha, 1999; 
Ha, 2001; Mohamed, 2003). It is clear that both the household’s available collateral, its 
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capability to search and process information on credit as well as its potential to make use of 
the credit, are important.  
As indicated by Pham and Lensink (2007) the availability of collateral is important in formal 
lending. One of the major reasons why households are not borrowing is their lack of proof of 
collateral. Especially land ownership has been shown to be important. Having collateral, or 
an institutional arrangement that overcomes the need for collateral such as group lending or 
government insurances, is a first step towards closing the gap between demand and supply. 
Arguably, being relatively rich also makes it more easy to be selected or to enable self-
selection in a group. Yet, as explained in Armendariz and Morduch (2005), this need for 
collateral even for small loans excludes the poorest of the poor, for whom the gap between 
demand and supply of credit seems to persist. VBSP issues loans without collateral, but they 
require group liability. In forming those lending groups, members may self-select themselves 
in or out. It is very probable that again the poorest of the poor are excluded.  
Apart from collateral, households need to have the capacity to overcome other transaction 
costs in taking out a loan. Apart from the evident costs of applying for a loan (filing the 
paperwork, going to the bank’s branch, and attending group meetings), potential borrowers 
are expected to search and process information on the lender, loan procedures, loan 
conditions, and loan interest rates. In addition, location and education seem to play a role. 
Furthermore, households with more social capital seemed to be more likely to borrow larger 
sums.  
If the institutions want to increase their clientele base, especially in the rural areas of Soc 
Trang and Tra Vinh provinces, they could consider making more efforts in reaching the 
potential clients in a strategy of financial outreach. Our experiences in the field suggest that 
most of the households in the surveyed location have limited information on formal credit 
accessibility. Sometimes, the households are in need of credit, they would like to borrow 
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from the government banks but they don’t know how to apply.  Financial institutions in the 
Mekong Delta in general and in the three provinces studied, could make more efforts in 
exchanging and transferring information on credit procedures in the rural villages. This 
would arguably not only increase the potential interest of households, but also improve the 
compliance of the clients to the bank’s rules and regulations.  
Moreover, financial institutions need to innovate and upgrade their activities such as human 
resource management, encouragement policies as well as apply new technologies in bank 
transfers. These will enable the financial institutions to reach more clients more effectively 
and efficiently. Furthermore, diversifying the type of loans offered and loan products such as 
lending for project investments could help rural households to plan loan expenditures based 
on their production cycles. In addition, financial institutions could adapt the loan procedure to 
their rural clients’ constraints. Finally, the institutions should consider the loan duration by 
focusing on medium and long-term loan contracts that could support agricultural and rural 
development. Developing specific proposals towards these types of credit widening and 
deepening for the Mekong Delta is an area for future research.  
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TABLES  
Table 1: Comparison between VBARD and VBSP to informal lenders  
 VBARD and VBSP Informal lenders 
Clients targets In favour of a larger scale 
investment, special targeting of 
poor households and illiterate 
clientele 
Small farmers in rural areas, and for 
lower income households and small 
scale enterprises in urban areas 
Administrative 
procedures 
Complex procedures Simple and straightforward 
procedures that are widely 
understood 
Collateral  Required land use certificate or 
other assets 
Depending on the relationship 
between lenders and borrowers 
Interest rate Low High 
Loan size Large Small 
Repayment rate Low High 
Source: VBARD and VBSP report, 2010  
Table 2: Comparison between traditional and informal approaches.  
 Traditional approach Informal lenders 
Assumptions Rural households in rural areas can 
save little from their income 
Assumed to be loan exploiters 
Interest rates Supplying cheap credit to increase 
the income of clients 
Supplying expensive credit to 
exploit own benefits 
Collateral  Borrowers meet certain conditions 
such as credit worthiness, collateral, 
profitable production plans 
Depending on the relationship 
between lenders and borrowers 
Initial capital State VBARD and VBSP Personal financial assets 
Risk for lenders Low because of government owned 
capital 
High but lowered by personal 
relationship 
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Table 3: Distribution of borrowers and non-borrowers in the sample 
 
Province Non-borrowers Borrowers Total 
Can Tho 41 
 
67 
 
108 
33.23% 
Soc Trang 35 
 
74 
 
109 
33.54% 
Tra Vinh 30 78 
 
108 
33.23% 
Total  106 
32.62% 
219 
67.38% 
325 
100% 
 
Table 4: Specification variables in the propensity score of models 
Yi Whether households have access to credit which takes the value of 1 if the households 
take credit, 0 otherwise. 
X1 The age of the household head in years 
X2 Gender: 1 if the head is male, 0 otherwise  
X3 Educational level (years) 
X4 Religion: 1 at least one religion, 0 otherwise 
X5 Marital status: 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
X6 Vietnamese ethnicity: 1 for Vietnamese households, 0 otherwise  
X7 Family size (persons) 
X8 Dependency ratio in percent  
X9 Have a job in village: 1 having a job in village for community building, 0 otherwise  
X10 Total land in use (in 1,000 m
2
)  
X11 Red certificate of land use right: 1 having a certificate, 0 otherwise  
X12 The value of building held by households (1,000 dongs) 
X13 The distance to the market centre of households (m) 
X14 Dummy location: 1 if the household is located in Can Tho, 0 otherwise
a
 
X15 Dummy location: 1 if the household is located in Soc Trang, 0 otherwise 
a 
 Note: The province of Tra Vinh is the base 
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Table 5: Characteristics of formal loans received by rural households in MD 2009 
Items 
 
Unit 
Mean 
Group-based 
borrowers 
Individual 
borrowers 
T-Statistic 
Average loan size 1,000 
dongs 
14,356 
(12,702) 
10,150 
(6,530) 
19,000 
(15,653) 
5.52*** 
Interest rates %/year 10.82 
(2.80) 
9.73 
(2.18) 
12.02 
(2.92) 
6.35*** 
Loan maturity Month 19.91 
(14.51) 
23.33 
(16.47) 
16.16 
(10.90) 
-3.84*** 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%. 
 
Table 6: Loan characteristics by two banks (means and standard deviation in 
parentheses) 
 
N 
Average VBARD 
91 
VBSP 
102 
T-statistic 
Loan amount 
(1,000VND) 
13,852 
(9,547) 
18,022 
(10,987) 
10,198 
(6,006) 
-6.19*** 
Interest rate (%) 10.62 
(2.94) 
       11.98 
(3.11) 
9.42 
(2.15) 
-6.67*** 
Loan duration 
(months) 
20.23 
(15.34) 
15.67 
(11.36) 
24.34 
(17.19) 
4.07*** 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Household characteristics (continuous variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) F-stat 
N 106 106 113  
Age of household 
(years) 
44  
(12) 
48 
(12) 
46  
(11) 
1.99 
Education level (years) 
9.0  
(3.8) 
10  
(3.4) 
8.70  
(3.16) 
4.90*** 
Family size (persons) 
4.9 
(1.6) 
5 
(1.5) 
4.9  
(1.61) 
1.01 
Dependency ratio (%) 
0.28  
(0.21) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
0.31 
(0.22) 
1.45 
Total land size (ha) 
11.78  
(13.13) 
15.25  
(10.18) 
6.38  
(8.17) 
8.16*** 
Value of assets (dongs) 
478,373  
(547,741) 
604,051 
 (497,757) 
353,286  
(652,349) 
5.64*** 
Distance to market 
center (m) 
1,400 
(603) 
842  
(368) 
577  
(507) 
75.64*** 
Notes: (1): Non-borrowers; (2) Individual borrowers; (3): Group-based borrowers 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%. 
 
Table 8: Household characteristics (categorical variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) Χ²-Stat 
N 106 106 113  
Gender (% male) 67 71 52 9.10
***
 
Married (% yes) 90 96 99 10.97
***
 
Red book certificate (yes) 92 97 82 13.94
***
 
Vietnamese (% yes) 62 41 51 9.15
***
 
Village Work (% yes) 18 19 18 0.44 
At least one religion (yes) 61 69 62 2.69
**
 
Can Tho (%) 37 27 35 8.72
**
 
Soc Trang (%) 33 37 31 0.50 
Tra Vinh (%) 28 37 35 1.85
*
 
Notes: (1): Non-borrowers; (2) Individual borrowers; (3): Group-based borrowers 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%. 
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Table 9: Factors affecting access to credit by rural households 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age (years) 0.0104 0.0158
*
 0.0115 
 (1.24) (1.65) (0.95) 
Gender (male=1) -0.158 -0.0826 -0.396 
 (-0.79) (-0.34) (-1.52) 
Education level (years) -0.0129 0.0311 -0.0586
*
 
 (-0.48) (0.96) (-1.68) 
At least one religion (yes=1) -0.124 0.0784 -0.359 
 (-0.68) (0.36) (-1.51) 
Marriage status (married=1) 1.011
***
 0.569 2.024
***
 
 (2.77) (1.40) (3.27) 
Vietnamese ethnic (yes=1) -0.263 -0.776
***
 0.168 
 (-1.06) (-2.59) (0.53) 
Family size (persons) -0.0150 -0.00614 -0.0386 
 (-0.27) (-0.09) (-0.54) 
Dependency ratio (%) -0.0787 -0.115 -0.131 
 (-0.19) (-0.24) (-0.23) 
Community involvement (yes=1) -0.0481 -0.288 0.417 
 (-0.19) (-0.98) (1.25) 
Total land (1000 m
2
) -0.00805 0.00871 -0.0428
***
 
 (-0.96) (0.91) (-3.38) 
Red certificate (yes=1) 0.0730 0.240 0.0702 
 (0.23) (0.51) (0.19) 
Building value (1,000 dongs) 0.0981 0.265
***
 -0.0394 
 (1.26) (2.63) (-0.41) 
Distance to market center (m) -0.00147
***
 -0.00147
***
 -0.0017
***
 
 (-8.61) (-6.42) (-7.73) 
Can Tho province (yes=1) -0.238 0.0417 -0.582
*
 
 (-0.94) (0.13) (-1.80) 
Soc Trang province (yes=1) -0.251 -0.324 -0.0169 
 (-0.97) (-1.08) (-0.05) 
Constant 0.287 -2.364
*
 1.260 
 (0.30) (-1.94) (0.97) 
N 324 211 221 
LR chi2 122.14 86.46 133.09 
Prob> Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo > Chi2 0.2992 0.2956 0.4352 
Log Likelihood -143.019 -103.024 -86.369 
Notes: (1): Pooled sample; (2) Individual – non-borrowers; (3): Group – non-borrowers 
t statistics in parentheses 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%. 
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Table 10: Factors affecting loan size by Heckman selection and double hurdle models 
 Heckman selection models Double hurdle models 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Age (year) 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.003 
 (1.58) (0.53) (0.85) (1.34) (0.15) (0.66) 
Gender (male=1) 0.128 0.005 0.076 0.152
*
 0.047 0.129 
 (1.36) (0.03) (0.75) (1.76) (0.35) (1.49) 
Education level (year) 0.0177 0.014 -0.006 0.019 0.007 0.005 
 (1.28) (0.58) (-0.35) (1.43) (0.34) (0.35) 
At least one religion (yes=1) -0.104 -0.122 -0.093 -0.085 -0.149 -0.034 
 (-1.11) (-0.83) (-0.88) (-0.98) (-1.12) (-0.38) 
Marital status (married=1) 0.0640 0.275 1.011
*
 -0.234 0.052 0.386 
 (0.18) (0.59) (1.99) (-0.88) (0.15) (0.91) 
Vietnamese ethnic (yes=1) 0.113 0.109 0.229 0.167 0.325
*
 0.174 
 (0.85) (0.30) (1.71) (1.42) (1.79) (1.46) 
Family size (person) -0.05
*
 -0.120
***
 -0.0212 -0.042
*
 -0.105
***
 -0.0158 
 (-1.67) (-2.43) (-0.73) (-1.63) (-2.54) (-0.61) 
Dependency ratio (%) -0.249 -0.239 -0.461
*
 -0.225 -0.169 -0.426
**
 
 (-1.24) (-0.76) (-2.02) (-1.20) (-0.62) (-2.05) 
Community involvement (yes=1) 0.315
***
 0.221 0.483
***
 0.333
***
 0.296
*
 0.397
***
 
 (2.68) (1.04) (3.60) (3.05) (1.72) (3.64) 
Total land (1,000 m2) 0.012
***
 0.009 0.001 0.013
***
 0.008 0.010
*
 
 (2.50) (1.16) (0.01) (2.88) (1.10) (1.77) 
Red certificate (yes=1) -0.0848 0.758 -0.176 -0.104 0.505 -0.188 
 (-0.54) (1.26) (-1.29) (-0.71) (1.07) (-1.55) 
Building value (1,000 dongs) 0.153
***
 0.153 0.0924
*
 0.131
***
 0.082 0.010
***
 
 (3.57) (1.25) (2.35) (3.55) (1.32) (2.80) 
Distance to market (m) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
*
 0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.57) (-0.28) (-1.59) (1.73) (1.56) (-0.32) 
Can Tho province (yes=1) -0.151 0.221 -0.463
**
 -0.106 0.182 -0.347
***
 
 (-1.09) (0.95) (-3.02) (-0.85) (0.85) (-2.85) 
Soc Trang province (yes=1) -0.065 -0.133 0.124 -0.005 -0.048 0.163 
 (-0.49) (-0.60) (0.90) (-0.04) (-0.28) (1.32) 
Constants 7.397
***
 7.040
***
 7.410
***
 7.811
***
 8.194
***
 7.739
***
 
 (12.41) (3.76) (12.46) (16.48) (10.45) (13.28) 
Mills lambda/sigma  0.487 0.530 0.485 0.562
***
 0.580
***
 0.402
***
 
 (1.16) (0.68) (1.65) (20.67) (14.31) (14.99) 
N 322 209 219 217 104 114 
Censored obs./Pseudo R2 105 105 105 0.181 0.168 0.379 
Uncensored obs./Log likelihood 217 104 114 -184.29 -91.45 -59.01 
Wald chi2/LR chi2 82.77 34.33 84.82 81.53 37.02 72.19 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Notes: (I): Pooled sample; (II) Individual – non-borrowers; (III): Group – non-borrowers 
t statistics in parentheses 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%. 
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FIGURES  
 
Figure 1: Map of survey location   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of credit institutions in the total number of borrowers of the three 
surveyed provinces 
 
Survey 
locations 
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Figure 3: Distribution of loan amounts received by the rural households in the Mekong 
Delta  
 
 
CHART: 
Chart 1: Lending procedure by VBARD banks in Vietnam and Mekong Delta 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  [1] Bank officials receive the loan application forms from the applicant;  
[2] After receiving the loan application forms, bank officials report to the head of the 
credit department;  
[3] The head of the credit department assigns a bank official to examine the loan 
application forms to see if they are filled in properly; 
[4] The assigned bank official appraises the applicant, mainly based on collateral;  
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 29 
[5] The assigned bank official informs the head of the credit department about the 
applicant;  
[6] The head of the credit department assesses the information and reports it to the 
director of the bank;  
[7] The director of the bank decides on the loan and informs the head of the credit 
department;  
[8] The head of credit department informs the assigned bank official about the 
decision;  
[9] The assigned bank officer informs the applicant;  
[10], [11], [12] Internal information among the bank’s specialized departments; 
[13] The treasury department disburses loans to the applicant, if accepted. 
 
Source: Adapted from Ninh (2003). 
 
Chart 2: Lending procedures by MFIs in Vietnam and Mekong 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[1]. Poor households prepare the requests for borrowing and submit them to the Savings & 
Credit Group  
[2]. Savings & Credit Group selects the households entitled to borrow and submits the list 
of borrowers to the Poverty Reduction Board and Commune People’s Committee.  
[3]. The Poverty Reduction Board and the Commune People’s Committee certify and pass 
on the list of poor households to the bank for consideration.  
[4]. The bank approves and announces to the Commune People’s Committee the results of 
the approved list of borrowers, the schedule and location of disbursement.  
[5]. Commune People’s Committee announces the bank’s results to Mass Organizations.  
[6]. Mass Organizations announce the approved results to the Savings & Credit Groups  
[7]. The Savings & Credit Groups announce the approved results to poor households; also 
announce the schedule and location of disbursement.  
[8]. The bank together with the Savings & Credit Groups directly disburses loans to the 
borrowing households. 
Source: Adapted from Vietnam Bank of Social Policy (2010) 
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